Giuseppe RUSSO | Progetti

VOTING RIGHTS FOR IMMIGRANTS

In the OECD, immigrants have voting rights in 74% of countries with proportional electoral systems and in 36% of countries with plurality electoral systems. Why do proportional systems support the voting franchise to immigrants? Although an extensive literature has been devoted to analize the effects of electoral systems, the possibility that electoral systems may affect the policymakers' incentives to enfranchise immigrants with voting rights has been overlooked. Does it exist a transmission mechanism from the electoral system to the decision of extending voting rights? Many authors find that proportional systems may bias spending toward extensive, non-targeted transfer programs, which better fit the need to secure larger majorities (Persson, 2004 and 2002; Persson and Tabellini, 2002; Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002; Ticchi and Vindigni, 2009). However, immigration may reverse this bias. The reversal may occur because it is hard to deny transfers based on nationality: Immigrants with the same characteristics as the natives cannot be discriminated forever. Transfers to non-voting immigrants reduce the policymaker's rent but are useless for re-election. Therefore, the policymaker may be better off by securing re-election through public goods or, if reforming public spending proves too difficult, by extending the voting franchise. In other words, the transmission mechanism from the electoral system to the extension of voting franchise could work through the bias on public spending determined by the electoral system. It is possible to examine this issue through the approach used by Persson and Tabellini in many of their papers. Note, in particular, that a rent-seeking policymaker may use immigration to increase the tax base, from which she retrieves her rents. A simple model of retrospective voting à la Persson and Tabellini (2002) provides us with a useful framework in order to analyze this issue. Thus, our analysis could extend the literature on electoral systems so as to include immigration issues. Since the integration of immigrants in the receiving societies may be fostered by granting voting rights, it is therefore possible that electoral systems play a role in the adaptation of immigrants to the host societies. These implications suggest research avenues to understand one of the most compelling issues on the political agenda, namely, the acculturation and adaptation of immigrant minorities. References Buchanan J. M., Tullock G. (1962), The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, University of Michigan Press. Duverger M. (1954), Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, Wiley, New York. Milesi-Ferretti G. M., Perotti R., Rostagno M., (2002) "Electoral Systems And Public Spending", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(2), pages 609-657, May. Persson T., (2002) Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy? Econometrica 70(3), 883-905. Persson T., TabelliniG., (2000), Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy, The MIT Press: Cambridge (Mass.). Persson T., Tabellini G., (2004), Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes, American Economic Review, 94, (1),25-45. Ticchi D., Vindigni A., (2009), Endogenous Constitutions, Economic Journal 120, 1-39.